An improved protection for the (mentally ill) trans parent: A queer reading of A.P., Garçon and Nicot v France by Gonzalez Salzberg, D.A.
This is a repository copy of An improved protection for the (mentally ill) trans parent: A 
queer reading of A.P., Garçon and Nicot v France.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/121964/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Gonzalez Salzberg, D.A. (2018) An improved protection for the (mentally ill) trans parent: A
queer reading of A.P., Garçon and Nicot v France. Modern Law Review, 81 (3). pp. 
526-538. ISSN 0026-7961 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12344
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
 1 
 
An improved protection for the (mentally ill) trans parent: A queer reading of A.P., 
Garçon and Nicot v France. 
Damian A. Gonzalez-Salzberg 
Abstract 
The European Court of Human Rights has been deciding cases concerning LGBT rights since 
the early 1980s. Its case law on trans rights has changed drastically through time, imposing 
upon the States of the Council of Europe certain minimum standards regarding the legal 
recognition of gender identity. In its recent judgment from April 2017 the Court laid down a 
new rule to be adopted by domestic legislation; namely, that the legal recognition of gender 
transition cannot be made conditional upon pursuing medical or surgical procedures which 
have (or are likely to have) sterilising effects. This article analyses the judgment from a 
critical perspective grounded on queer theory, weighting both the positive and the negative 
elements RIWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ 
 
Keywords: European Court of Human Rights, LGBT rights, trans rights, gender recognition, 
gender transition, queer theory. 
 
Introduction 
On 6 April 2017 the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter µthe Court¶) delivered its 
judgment on A.P., Garçon and Nicot v France. This is the most recent judgment in a series of 
cases concerning trans law decided by the Court since the 1980s.1 During its first two decades 
                                                          

 Lecturer in Law, University of Sheffield. I am grateful to my friend and colleague Dr Yin Harn Lee and to the 
anonymous reviewer for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1
 :LWKLQWKLVSLHFH,IROORZ6WHSKHQ:KLWWOH¶VXVHRIWKHWHUPµtrans¶, as an umbrella term to refer to any person 
who does not perceive their gender identity as the same as was socially expected for them to perceive following 
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dealing with gender identity, the Court refused to find that States were under an obligation to 
grant full legal recognition to the gender transition of applicants who brought their claims to 
Strasbourg. The turning point in the case law was in 2002, when the Court decided that the 
lack of full recognition of the gender of two trans women who had undergone a gender 
transition process provided by the State was a violation of the right to respect for their private 
life.2 The cases brought to Strasbourg within the last fifteen years have mostly dealt with the 
State-imposed requirements to be fulfilled by trans individuals for obtaining full legal 
recognition of their gender. In A.P., Garçon and Nicot, the Court revisited its position 
regarding two of these requirements: sterilisation and, incidentally, genital surgery. 
 The case involved three trans women who had been denied due recognition of their 
gender identity in France, as the domestic courts considered that they had not fulfilled the 
different requirements imposed by the legislation for obtaining the legal recognition of their 
gender. The Court examined the 2012 French legislation on gender transition in light of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter µthe Convention¶), having to decide 
whether some of the requirements imposed by said legislation were compatible with the 
obligations emanating from Article 8. This article establishes that every person has the right 
to respect for their private life and, therefore, should be free from unjustified interference by 
a public authority with the exercise of such a right.3  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
gender classification at birth. Conversely, if I use the term µtransgender¶ or µtranssexual¶ I follow the term used 
in the specific case to which the reference is made. See:  S. Whittle, Respect and Equality: Transsexual and 
Transgender Rights (London: Cavendish, 2002) xxii-xxiii. 
2
 Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom [GC] (2002) 35 EHRR 18; I. v United Kingdom [GC] (2003) 36 EHRR 
53. 
3
 Even though the legislation had been amendment on 12 October 2016, the Court analysed the case under the 
previous norm, as that was the OHJDO JURXQGV IRU UHMHFWLQJ WKH DSSOLFDQWV¶ FODLPV 7KH QHZ OHJLVODWLRQ KDV
adopted a model that still contemplates judicial intervention for legal gender recognition, but no longer requires 
 3 
 
 While the Court decided to examine the three applications jointly,4 each of them 
presented some differences. Ms A.P., the first applicant, had been diagnosed with Harry 
%HQMDPLQ¶V6\QGURPHfollowing consultation with medical doctors in France. She decided to 
undergo genital surgery in Thailand, because she believed that surgery was a required step to 
obtain legal recognition of her gender in France. Nevertheless, the domestic courts denied her 
request for gender recognition as she refused to undergo physical and psychological 
evaluations by an inter-disciplinary medical team. These examinations were imposed by the 
legislation in order to µconfirm¶ that, at the time of a request for gender recognition, the 
applicant should still be medically considered as transsexual (sic) and to corroborate that the 
DSSOLFDQW¶V JHQLWDOLD match those expected in a person of their asserted gender. Before the 
Strasbourg Court, Ms A.P. complained that the required intrusive examinations by an inter-
disciplinary team amounted to a violation of her Convention rights, mainly the right to 
respect for her private life. 
 The second applicant, Ms Émil[i]e Garçon, was undergoing hormonal treatment when 
she brought her claim to the domestic courts. Her request was rejected as she did not provide 
due medical certification of her transsexuality (sic) and, most importantly, she failed to prove 
that she had undergone a gender transition process that could be considered µirreversible¶. 
Similarly, the third applicant, Ms Stéphan[i]e Nicot, faced the rejection of her claim because 
the domestic courts did not consider her gender transition to be irreversible, as she had not 
undergone genital surgery. Both applicants submitted to the Court that the requirement of 
sterilisation, as implicitly demanded by the need to have undergone an µirreversible¶ 
transition, was a violation of the right to respect for private life. Ms Garçon also argued that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the applicant to prove having undergone any type of medical or surgical treatment. See: A.P., Garçon and Nicot 
v France ECtHR 6 April 2017 at [68]. 
4
 ibid at [82]. 
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the legal requirement of medical certification of mental illness amounted to a further 
violation of the Convention. Therefore, when the case came to Strasbourg, the Court had to 
decide whether the piece of domestic legislation that conditioned gender recognition upon 
intrusive medical examinations, medical diagnosis of a mental disorder, and having 
undergone an irreversible transition, was compatible with the Convention.5  
 The present article uses queer theory as a theoretical lens to read the case under study. 
Queer theory offers a post-structural view on identities that contest their stability, challenging 
the fixity of categories such as sex, gender and sexuality, as well as the traditional 
construction of these characteristics as opposed binaries.6 Following the work of Judith 
Butler, queer theory rejects the traditional distinction between sex and gender, understanding 
both concepts to be cultural constructions with no causal relation tying them together.7 It 
proposes that identities are performatively constructed through the reiteration of acts, 
opposing the idea of an internal essence of the body that materialises as genders and 
sexualities.8 However, these performative identities are not freely chosen by the individual, 
but are an effect of regulatory systems.9 4XHHUWKHRU\PDNHVXVHRI0LFKHO)RXFDXOW¶VZRUN
to question the techniques of knowledge and power deployed by a normalising society that 
                                                          
5
 ibid at [83]-[85]. 
6
 A. Jagose, Queer Theory: An Introduction (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1996) 3; C. Stychin, 
/DZ¶V'HVLUH6H[XDOLW\DQGWKH/LPLWVRI-XVWLFH (London: Routledge, 1995) 141; J. Weeks, The Language of 
Sexuality (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011) 146. 
7
 J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Abingdon: Routledge, 1990) 10-11 and 
43-44. Consequently, the article uses the terms µsex¶ and µgender¶ interchangeably. 
8
 N. Sullivan, A Critical Introduction to Queer Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006) 89-90; A. 
Jagose, n 6 above, 90-91. 
9
 -%XWOHUµ&ULWLFDOO\4XHHU¶LQ S. Phelan (ed), Playing with Fire: Queer Politics, Queer Theories (New York: 
Routledge, 1997) 16. 
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discursively produces and regulates gender and sexual identities.10 It problematises 
established disciplinary regimes that subject the body to permanent surveillance, 
classifications and social control. A queer standpoint not only celebrates those acts and 
identities that depart from the norm, but it even opposes the idea of normal behaviour itself.11 
Accordingly, a queer perspective challenges the regulatory systems that put in place a 
sex/gender model that is binary (there are only two categories available), mandatory 
(everyone belongs to a category) and largely involuntary (the categories are imposed at birth 
following pre-established criteria) and which problematises those individuals who reject 
being fitted into the assigned category. 
 Moreover, queer theory is characterised by the use of a deconstructive method that 
enables it to unveil inconsistencies within gender and sexual discourses. Consequently, the 
analysis of the case is conducted through the use of six deconstructive binaries that can be 
found in the judgment and that provide the structure of the article.12 These binaries allow us 
to analyse different aspects of the judgment, and emphasise how specific issues were raised 
as dichotomies to be decided by the Court. The binary pairs are: inside/outside, 
reversible/irreversible, genitocentrism/self-determination, mental disorder/body diversity, 
surveillance/potential deception, and µwrong body¶/wrong classification. 
                                                          
10
 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) 53-57 and 139-
145. 
11
 M. Warner, The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics and the Ethics of Queer Life (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000) xxvii. 
12
 For the use of deconstructive binaries as a methodological tool, see: E. Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of 
the Closet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) 9±&6W\FKLQ µ&RXSOLQJV&LYLO3DUWQHUVKLSLQ
WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP¶   New York City Law Review 543; D. Gonzalez-6DO]EHUJ µ7KH 0DNLQJ RI WKH
&RXUW¶V +RPRVH[XDO $ 4XHHU 5HDGLQJ RI WKH (XURSHDQ &RXUW RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV¶ &DVH /DZ RQ 6DPH-Sex 
6H[XDOLW\¶(2014) 65 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 371. 
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Inside/outside (the Convention) 
The inside/outside binary has been largely used within queer theory as presenting the original 
dichotomy, since every opposite pair emulates the inside or outside dynamic.13 The law also 
follows this binary character, which allows the classification of every conduct as 
lawful/unlawful. For the purpose of this analysis the inside/outside examination performed by 
the Court is also the first legal examination of the merits of a case, as it establishes whether 
the substantial claims fit within the framework of the Convention. On this occasion, the Court 
KDGWRGHFLGHZKHWKHUWKHDSSOLFDQWV¶FODLPVILWted inside the scope of the right to respect for 
private life. The answer was affirmative. The Court highlighted that its jurisprudence had 
already recognised that the right to respect for private life protects a diversity of interests, 
including the gender identity of individuals.14  
 It clarified that while its case law had mostly dealt with trans individuals who had 
undergone a gender transition process provided by the national health system of the State, 
this certainly did not mean that: 
...the issue of the legal recognition of the gender identity of transgender 
individuals who have not undergone a gender reassignment treatment approved by 
the authorities, or those who do not wish to follow such a treatment, is outside of 
the scope or article 8.15 
 
That is to say, not only did the present applications fit inside the scope of the Convention, but 
the Court also seemed willing to deal with future cases regarding the gender identity of trans 
                                                          
13
 D. Fuss (ed), Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories (New York: Routledge, 1991) 1. 
14
 A.P., Garçon and Nicot v France n 3 above, at [93]-[96]. 
15
 Own translation from the original French: µOn ne saurait toutefois en déduire que la question de la 
UHFRQQDLVVDQFH OpJDOH GH O¶LGHQWLWp VH[XHOOH GHV SHUVRQQHV WUDQVJHQUHV TXL Q¶RQW SDV VXEL XQ WUDLWHPHQW GH
réassignation sexuelle agréé par les autorités ou qui ne souhaitent pas subir un tel traitement échappe au champ 
G¶DSSOLFDWLRQGHO¶DUWLFOHGHOD&RQYHQWLRQ¶ A.P., Garçon and Nicot v France n 3 above, at [94]. 
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people who do not fit the traditional conception of transsexuality so far discussed in its 
jurisprudence. In fact, WKH&RXUWFODULILHGWKDWWKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶VSURWHFWLRQLVQRWUHVWULFWHGWR
trans individuals who pursue gender transition through surgical and hormonal means, thereby 
rejecting a universalising view of the trans community in which gender identity is necessarily 
linked to achieving gender characteristics through medicalised paths.16 
 Moreover, within this step, the Court identified the main question to be answered in 
the judgment: did WKHOHJLVODWLRQLQIRUFHDWWKHWLPHEUHDFK)UDQFH¶VSRVLWLYHREOLJDWLRQVWR 
protect the gender identity of the applicants? As mentioned above, the three requirements 
whose compatibility with the Convention was under question were the proof of irreversibility 
of the gender transition, the need for a medical diagnosis, and the requirement of undergoing 
medical examinations, which are discussed in the following sections. 
 
Reversible/Irreversible (µtransformation¶) 
Ms Garçon and Ms Nicot both claimed that the legislation requesting the µirreversible 
character of the transformation of the appearance¶17 of those who demanded the legal 
recognition of their gender was imposing the requirement of sterilisation. Therefore, the 
Court had to analyse the dichotomous position in which the applicants had been placed 
having to choose between the legal recognition of their gender and the possibility of starting 
or continuing a biological family. This was not the first time that the Court had to decide on 
the familial character of trans individuals. Twenty years before this case, it ruled that a State 
                                                          
16
 &5LFKLHµ/HVVRQVIURP4XHHU%LRHWKLFV$5HVSRQVHWR7LPRWK\)0XUSK\¶Bioethics 365, 366. 
17
 Own translation from the original French: µFDUDFWqUHLUUpYHUVLEOHGHODWUDQVIRUPDWLRQGH>O¶@DSSDUHQFH.¶ A.P., 
Garçon and Nicot v France n 3 above, at [83]. 
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was under no obligation to recognise a trans man as the father of his child, since he was not 
the biological father.18 
 Moreover, in a judgment issued in 2015, the Court dealt with a specific issue 
concerning sterilisation of trans individuals, when it analysed Turkish legislation that 
imposed sterilisation as a requirement in order to be entitled to undergo gender 
reassignment.19 However, the only clear rule laid down by the Court in that judgment was 
that sterilisation could not be a requirement for authorising a gender transition process. It 
avoided offering a straightforward opinion regarding whether sterilisation could ever be a 
requirement for the legal recognition of gender, especially if it was a consequence of 
compulsory surgery. This was a question the Court had to finally answer in the present case. 
 On this occasion, the Court clarified that the starting point of the analysis was to 
presume that the µirreversible¶ character of the transformation meant that either sterilising 
surgery or a medical treatment very likely to cause sterilisation was requested by the 
authorities.20 It then went on to set the degree of discretion allowed to States on this topic.21 It 
stated that, on the one hand, the case dealt with fundamental aspects of the private life of 
individuals, those of gender identity and of sterilisation.22 On the other hand, there were 
public interest issues at stake, such as the inability of individuals to freely amend their civil 
status and the reliability and coherence of civil registers.23 Nonetheless, the Court clarified 
that in reaching a fair balance between the interests under discussion, the State only had a 
                                                          
18
 X, Y and Z v the United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 143 at [52]. 
19
 Y.Y. v Turkey ECtHR 10 March 2015. 
20
 A.P., Garçon and Nicot v France n 3 above, at [120]. 
21
 For a discussion on the complexity of the doctrine of the µmargin of appreciation¶ developed by the Court, 
VHH*/HWVDVµ7ZR&RQFHSWVRIWKH0DUJLQRI$SSUHFLDWLRQ¶Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705. 
22
 A.P., Garçon and Nicot v France n 3 above, at [123]. 
23
 ibid at [122]. 
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narrow margin of appreciation. This was the case notwithstanding the lack of European 
consensus on the matter, because there existed a European trend towards abandoning the 
requirement of sterilisation for recognising the gender identity of trans individuals.24 In 
support of its position, the Court mentioned that the requirement of sterilisation had been 
heavily criticised as a human rights violation by different international bodies, such as the 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, and other United 
Nations agencies.25  
 Taking into consideration all those factors, the Court concluded that the 
µirreversibility¶ of the transition requested by the legislation at the time was a violation of the 
ULJKWWRUHVSHFWIRUWKHDSSOLFDQWV¶SULYDWHOLIHEHFDXVHLWLPSRVHGHLWKHUVXUJLFDOVWHULOLVDWLRQ
or a medical treatment likely to lead to sterilisation.26 In other words, the applicants should 
have not been requested to become sterile women in order to obtain full legal recognition of 
their gender. On the contrary, the Court implicitly acknowledged that prospective female 
fathers are bearers of rights under the Convention, as the legal recognition of their gender 
cannot be made dependent on sacrificing their reproductive capacities. Thus, the Court 
showed its willingness to revisit the discussion on the familial character of trans individuals 
in future cases. 
 
Genitocentrism/self-determination 
The relationship between the OHJDOUHFRJQLWLRQRIJHQGHUWUDQVLWLRQDQGLQGLYLGXDOV¶JHQLWDOLD
has changed through time in WKH &RXUW¶V MXULVSUXGHQFH. As mentioned above, a shifting 
                                                          
24
 ibid at [124]. 
25
 ibid at [125]. 
26
 ibid at [135]. 
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moment in the case law was in 2002 when the Court finally ruled that the Convention 
imposed upon States the obligation to recognise the gender identity of trans individuals. This 
jurisprudential shift came together with a change in the criterion used to determine whether a 
person had transitioned gender. Alex Sharpe explains that the criterion used by the courts in 
order to determine what sex/gender is and, therefore, whether (and when) it has changed, has 
followed different models.27 It is possible to see that tKH &RXUW¶V HDUOLHU FDVH ODZ on 
transsexuality followed a biological moGHO DFFRUGLQJ WR ZKLFK D SHUVRQ¶s gender was 
considered to be a biological fact which could not be changed, since: µ...gender reassignment 
surgery does not result in the acquisition of all the biological characteristics of the other 
sex¶.28 Therefore, an inGLYLGXDO¶VJHQLWDOLDGLGQRWQHFHVVDULO\PDWFKWKHLUOHJDOJHQGHUDVWKH
Court did not consider States to be bound by the Convention to recognise gender transition. 
 In 2002 this understanding of immutable biological gender was abandoned in favour 
of an anatomical model in which gender was to be found in the surgically modified anatomy 
of the post-operative trans person.29 The Court allowed States to impose genital surgery as a 
requirement for obtaining gender recognition,30 disclosing what Sharpe has labelled the 
genitocentrism of the law;31 namely, the idea that gender is determined by the presence of 
                                                          
27
 A. Sharpe, Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law (London: Cavendish, 2002) 139 and 142. 
28
 Cossey v the United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 622 at [40]. 
29
 D. Gonzalez-6DO]EHUJ µ7KH $FFHSWHG 7UDQVVH[XDO DQG WKH $EVHQW 7UDQVJHQGHU $ 4XHHU 5HDGLQJ RI WKH
5HJXODWLRQ RI 6H[*HQGHU E\ WKH (XURSHDQ &RXUW RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV¶   American University 
International Law Review 797, 817.  
30
 L. v Lithuania (2008) 46 EHRR 22; Nunez v France (dec) ECtHR 27 April 2006. 
31
 A. Sharpe, n 27 above, 9 and 39. 
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specific functioning genitalia.32 In fact, the Court seemed to assume that genital surgery was 
the required culmination of the gender transition process.33 
 Nevertheless, as a consequence of its finding regarding sterilisation in A.P., Garçon 
and Nicot, the Court has now implicitly rejected this model. Although the focus of the 
judgment was on the issue of sterilisation, and not on genital surgery, the examination of the 
former had clear consequences on the latter. As discussed above, the Court ruled that gender 
recognition cannot be subject to procedures, either surgical or medical, that cause sterility. 
Given that genital surgery can be considered a sterilising procedure, it follows that it cannot 
be used any longer as a requirement to be fulfilled in order to obtain the legal recognition of 
gender transition.  
 This specific point of the judgment could be interpreted as a monumental shift in the 
&RXUW¶Vcase law: the expected congruence between genitalia and gender cannot be imposed 
by law. Indeed, the Court recognised that not every trans person can -or even wishes to- go 
through a gender reassignment process that leads (or is likely to lead) to sterility.34 While 
some trans people will desire to undergo genital surgery, others will not. However, one¶V
position towards genital surgery should not determine gender recognition. Thus, the Court 
overcame its previous obsession with genitalia -the genitocentrism of its (case) law.  
 The end of an imposed causal link between anatomy and gender came to reaffirm the 
performative character of gender. Gender can no longer be naturalised by law as the evident 
expression of an anatomical feature. Nonetheless, the Court did not embrace a self-
determination model either, in which individuals would have the right to decide their gender 
                                                          
32
 Ibid 62. 
33
 D. Gonzalez-Salzberg, n 29 above, 819. 
34
 A.P., Garçon and Nicot v France n 3 above, at [126]. 
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free from State-endorsed normalising dictates.35 Medicine will continue to play a central role 
in establishing the basis of the legal recognition of gender, as the Court abandoned the 
anatomical criterion for gender recognition in favour of a purely psychiatric model. 
 
Mental disorder/body diversity 
The pathologisation of trans identities remains common practice in medical discourse. Both 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) of the American 
3V\FKLDWULF $VVRFLDWLRQ DQG WKH :RUOG +HDOWK 2UJDQLVDWLRQ¶V ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 6WDWLVWLFDO
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10) continue to consider 
µgender dysphoria¶ and µtranssexualism¶, respectively, as mental disorders.36 That is to say, 
the incongruence between the gender identity of individuals and the legal gender assigned at 
birth is considered to be pathological. As it is the case with many other judicial bodies,37 the 
Court has largely relied on the scientific power of medicine for justifying its decisions in 
cases concerning trans applicants.38 This means that it issues judgments that -combining the 
powerful discourses of both law and medicine- produce an accepted µtruth¶ about trans 
identities as pathological.39 
                                                          
35
 Recent legislation from Argentina (2012) and Denmark (2014), for instance, has adopted a self-determination 
model for amending legal gender. See: Argentine Law 26.743 at 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/195000-199999/197860/norma.htm (last accessed 1 August 
2017) 7UDQVJHQGHU (XURSH µ'HQPDUN 3DVVHV %HVW /HJDO *HQGHU 5HFRJQLWLRQ /DZ LQ (XURSH¶ at  
http://tgeu.org/denmark-goes-argentina/ (last accessed 1 August 2017). 
36
 For a detailed history on the medicalisation of trans identities see: A. Sharpe, n 27 above, chapter II. 
37
 ibid at [8]. 
38
 Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom [GC] n 2 above, at [78] and [81]; I. v United Kingdom [GC] n 2 above, 
at [58] and [61]; Van Kück v Germany (2003) 37 EHRR 51 at [54]; Schlumpf v Switzerland ECtHR 8 January 
2009 at [57]. 
39
 A. Sharpe, n 27 above, 8-9; D. Gonzalez-Salzberg, n 29 above, 808. 
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 This acceptance of the pathological grounds of a claim to gender recognition is 
connected with the second requirement examined by the Court. Ms Garçon argued that the 
need to prove the µtruth of [her] transsexuality¶,40 in order to obtain recognition of her gender, 
infringed the right to respect for her private life. However, the Court rejected her claim. It 
stated that the need to be medically diagnosed as suffering from a mental disorder could be a 
valid requirement for allowing gender recognition, given the wide margin of appreciation 
enjoyed by the States in the area.41 Even though some twenty paragraphs before the Court 
had affirmed that the margin of appreciation of States was narrow when dealing with 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V JHQGHU LGHQWLW\ WKH PDUJLQ VXGGHQO\ EHFDPH ZLGHr when it concerned the 
pathologisation of trans identities.  
 In order to justify the wide margin of discretion left to the State, the Court provided 
an accumulation of arguments. It affirmed that the majority of Member States of the Council 
of Europe require such a diagnosis and also highlighted that other international human rights 
bodies do not seem to have adopted a strong view on whether the pathologisation of trans 
identities amounts to a violation of human rights. Most importantly, as it had done in 
previous judgments, the Court emphasised that medical science continues to view 
transsexuality as a mental illness.42 With reference to the ICD-10, the Court reiterated that 
µtranssexualism¶ remains recognised as a mental disorder.  
 Nevertheless, these cumulative arguments presented by the Court can be subject to 
different criticisms. First, it is difficult to understand why the European consensus that was 
considered rather irrelevant when examining the requirement of sterilisation became 
                                                          
40
 Own translation from the original French: µréalité du syndrome transsexuel¶ A.P., Garçon and Nicot v France 
n 3 above, at [83]. 
41
 ibid at [143]-[144]. 
42
 ibid at [139]. 
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important to widen the margin of appreciation of the State on this new issue. If a trend 
towards forbidding sterilisation was enough to limit the discretion of States, a similar 
tendency can be found regarding the depathologisation of trans identities.43 Similarly, the 
reference to other international bodies is inaccurate, as many have expressed their strong 
views against both sterilisation and pathologisation.44 Lastly, the recourse to medical 
discourse as the almighty source of answers concerning trans issues remains problematic; 
especially since the requirements for the legal recognition of gender identity are a matter of 
law and not of medical science.45 
 ,QDGGLWLRQWKH&RXUWDGRSWHGWKH6WDWH¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWDSV\FKRGLDJQRVWLFtest was in 
place to help individuals who were not µtruly transgender¶46 from erroneously pursuing an 
irreversible gender transition process.47 This position seems based on the traditional medical 
view that only some trans individuals, those who are diagnosed as µtrue¶ transsexuals, should 
be allowed to undergo genital surgery.48 Meanwhile, other trans persons should be banned 
from accessing such a procedure, as their surgical desire is revealed untrue. Traditionally, this 
was the case of trans individuals who have experienced sexual genital pleasure or those who 
                                                          
43
 ibid at [68] and [72]. 
44
 See: United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on Germany, E/C.12/DEU/CO/5, at [26] (20 May 2011); 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Issue Paper on Human Rights and Gender Identity, 
CommDH/IssuePaper, at [3.3] (29 July 2009); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Violence against 
LGBTI Persons in the Americas, OAS/Ser.L/V/II.rev.1, at [419] and recommendations 26 (12 November 2015); 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Discrimination against Transgender people in Europe, 
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might be rendered non-heterosexual through genital surgery.49 However, it appears rather 
unnecessary to require people to be certified as mentally ill, in order to protect others from 
µerroneously¶ transitioning gender. This medicalised approach creates a three-tier system of 
mental stability in which the cisgender population is considered to be mentally sound, 
transsexual individuals are deemed mentally ill, but this is just to protect a third group of 
people who might be at risk of transitioning into homosexuality. At the very least, the 
controversial character of this position required further support, if it was to be validated by 
the Court. 
 This new endorsement of the pathologisation of trans identities is extremely 
problematic. It continues to support the understanding of gender in binary terms, rendering 
abnormal those bodies that do not fit the category in which they have been placed at birth, as 
well as those others who refuse embracing one of the only two available categories.50 It also 
reinforces the regulatory power of medical tools, such as the ICD-10 and the DSM-5, by 
reifying them as the scientific grounds of judicial decisions, while overlooking the fact that 
these are evolving texts susceptible to socio-political influences.51 Moreover, it obstructs 
queer and trans activism that seeks a paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of variant gender 
identities, from mental disorders to expressions of body diversity.52  
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 While the issue of depathologisation remains controversial even within the trans 
community, where fears about further encumbering access to trans health care has led to a 
lack of general agreement on the topic,53 queer politics¶ stance in favour of the 
depathologisation of sexual and gendered behaviour is unequivocal.54 Depathologising trans 
identities can help raise awareness to the fact that the source of the distress experienced by 
many trans individuals might not be located in their suffered µdysphoria¶, but in a society that 
is disciplined into embracing gender binarism and stigmatising those who escape the assumed 
rigid limits of the two sides of the binary.55 
 Overall, after taking an important step towards ending the sterilisation of individuals, 
the Court decided to stop short of also demanding an end to the pathologisation of trans 
identities. Under the Convention, trans individuals can still be made to choose between their 
gender and their official mental health, since in order to obtain the recognition of the former 
they can be requested to surrender the latter. A queer desire for the celebration of body 
diversity, trumping the stigma of the pathologisation of non-normative gender expressions,56 
LV\HWWRDUULYHWRWKH&RXUW¶VFDVHODZ 
 
Surveillance/potential deception 
The last claim examined by the Court was that of Ms A.P. She argued that having to be 
subjected to an intrusive medical examination to obtain the legal recognition of her gender 
amounted to a violation of the right to respect for her private life. The need for this thorough 
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medical H[DPLQDWLRQRIDSHUVRQ¶VJHQGHUseems to be linked to a more general legal concern 
about the deceiving character of trans individuals.57 A concern about trans people concealing 
some µtruth¶ about their gender from other members of society provides the State with the 
authority to place trans bodies under surveillance in order to protect the potential fraud 
victims. The 2012 legislation allowed France the ability to certify the past, present and future 
RIWUDQVLQGLYLGXDOV¶JHQGHU7KHSDVWE\UHTXLULQJWKHPHGLFDOGLDJQRVLVWRDOORZIRUJHQGHU
transition; the present, through the examinations in question; and the future, through the 
irreversible character of the treatment undergone by those requesting gender recognition.  
 The Court rejected 0V$3¶Vclaim, stating that: 
...even if the medical examination ordered imposed a genital exam of the first 
applicant, the degree of interference with the right to respect for her private life 
which would have resulted from such an exam should be significantly qualified.58 
 
That is to say, the Court understood that the examination would be an interference with the 
right to respect for her private life, but considered that it did not amount to a violation of the 
right, given WKH6WDWH¶VQHHGWRoversee the gender transition process.  
 However, the validatiRQRIWKHDSSOLFDQW¶Vgenital exam seems rather inconsistent with 
the other issues decided in the judgment. According to the &RXUW¶VILQGLQJ, the State was not 
allowed to demand genital surgery as a requirement for gender transition. Gender transition 
was less a physical matter than a consequence of a mental disorder -as accepted by the Court. 
Therefore, if States can no longer subject gender recognition to genital surgery due to its 
sterilising effect, why would they be entitled to force trans individuals to undergo a physical 
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examination of their genitalia? It certainly lacks consistency to have finally struck down the 
requirement of genital surgery, but still allow intrusive medical examinations to corroborate 
the fulfilment of the forbidden requirement.  
 On the contrary, certain level of coherence can be found if we believe that the State is 
still entitled to notarise the gender µstatus¶ of trans individuals. While not validating genital 
surgery any longer, the Court at least allows the State to know, and probably even register, 
the current details RI WKH DSSOLFDQWV¶ genitalia when requesting gender recognition (the 
µpresent gender¶). Similarly, there is a strong connection between this finding of the Court 
and the reinforced pathologisation of trans identities: both constitute expressions of a 
disciplinary regime that places indiviGXDOV¶ERGLHVXQGHUVXUYHLOODQFH and social control.  
 
µWrong body¶/Wrong classification  
When deciding to strike down the requirement of sterilisation contained in the domestic 
legislation, the Court argued that its phrasing, which read the µirreversible character of the 
transformation of the appearance¶,59 was problematic. It stated that while the term 
µappearance¶ seemed to refer to a rather superficial transformation, the µirreversible¶ character 
conveyed the idea of a radical change. It affirmed that this was a case of a µproblematic 
ambiguity¶, since it rendered the requirement quite unclear.60 The expression used by the 
Court is peculiar, since it usually finds ambiguity to be problematic in itself. In fact, gender 
DPELJXLW\ KDV EHHQ D NH\ IDFWRU LQ WKH &RXUW¶V FDVH ODZ RQ gender transition. One of the 
reasons for establishing that States were under the obligation to grant legal recognition to the 
gender transition of individuals was the fact that the domestic law of the United Kingdom 
was treating trans individuals with ambiguity, recognising their avowed gender in some legal 
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aspects, while treating them as belonging to their assigned gender in others.61 ,QWKH&RXUW¶V
own words: µ[t]he unsatisfactory situation in which post-operative transsexuals live in an 
intermediate zone as not quite one gender or the other is no longer sustainable.¶62 That is to 
say, the Court found that the lack of a neat fit within binary gender categories was not 
acceptable under the Convention. As mentioned above, this was the turning point at which 
the Court decided to abandon the µbiological¶ model of gender, as determined by 
chromosomes, to embrace the idea of an anatomical gender unveiled through surgery. This 
desired congruence between gender and genitalia put an end to the ambiguous legal existence 
of post-operative trans people in the United Kingdom. 
 Nonetheless, one of the reasons a queer approach would find to celebrate in the 
judgment in A.P., Garçon and Nicot is that a degree of ambiguity can be discovered once 
again under the Convention, if so desired. The traditional congruence between genitalia and 
gender cannot be demanded by State Parties any longer as a requirement for gender 
recognition. *HQGHUFODVVLILFDWLRQWKDWLVQRWGHSHQGHQWRQRQH¶VJHQLWDOLDhas returned to the 
&RXUW¶V MXULVSUXGHQFH EXW WKLV WLPH it is not a consequence of the denial of gender 
recognition, as in the Court¶s early case law.63 Now, it can be requested by the applicants. 
 Even though there are still multiple paths to queer identities that have not yet found a 
place within the Convention,64 the recognition of gender identity detached from genitalia 
might allow applicants to move away from the required narratives of being born in the 
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µwrong body¶65 to the (slightly) less problematic claim of having the right body, but suffer 
from the wrong legal classification. In other words, trans bodies do not need to fit within a 
predetermined anatomical pattern for demanding gender recognition. Moreover, this opens a 
path for subversive queer identities to claim protection of their rights under the Convention, 
such as the family rights of the pregnant man or the female father. However, collaboration 
from medical discourse will still be required, as the Court continues to allow medical science 
to act as the gate-keeper of gender recognition. 
 
Conclusion 
7KH&RXUW¶VUHFHQWMXGJPHQWLQA.P., Garçon and Nicot v France was multifaceted, deciding 
three different issues in very dissimilar manners. On the one hand, the judgment reflects a 
remarkable FKDQJH LQ WKH &RXUW¶V FULWHULD RQ WUDQV ULJKWV Gender recognition cannot be 
subject to treatments that are sterilising, or even potentially sterilising if that effect is likely to 
occur, as this would amount to a violation of the right to respect for private life. This also 
means that genital surgery, the central element for gender transition according to the last 
fifteen years of WKH &RXUW¶V jurisprudence, can no longer be a requirement for gender 
recognition under the Convention system. As a consequence, the domestic legislation 
concerning gender recognition of 29 of the 47 Member States of the Council of Europe is 
now in contravention of the Convention.66 On the other hand, the other two complaints were 
rejected by the Court. States can retain genital examinations as a requirement for gender 
recognition, even though this appears to be in contradiction with the finding that States 
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cannot maintain genital surgery as a requirement. At the same time, the pathologisation of 
trans identities has been left within the margin of appreciation of the States.  
 It might be difficult to understand why, after opposing sterilisation, the Court decided 
to validate the pathologisation of trans identities, but it does not come as a complete surprise. 
TKH&RXUW¶V MXULVSUXGHQFH on trans law has been full of apparent trade-offs: you cannot be 
recognised as the father of your child, but you are (de facto) family;67 you can marry after 
transitioning gender, as long as it is heterosexually;68 your gender identity will be recognised, 
as soon as you sacrifice your genitalia.69 Now, you can be a trans parent, as long as you have 
been diagnosed as mentally ill.70 While this judgment contains different aspects worthy of 
(queer) celebration, it also made the on-going pathologisation of trans identities a clear target 
for the next dispute over trans rights under the Convention. 
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